SEC.01
The playbook
The run starts read-only: the recon probes decide what happens next. The steps that follow are adapted to the distribution and state found — a real machine is rarely clean.
- 01recondoes the user exist? home folder and shell
- 02reconkey location (AuthorizedKeysFile may be non-standard)
- 03reconfingerprints of the current keys
- 04reconis the new key valid? its SHA256 fingerprint
- 05reconis the new key already present?
- 06reconSELinux (restorecon needed on ~/.ssh)
- 07actBack up the keysverify
- 08actAdd the new keyverify
- 09actFix owner and permissionsverify
- 10actTest the new key (login by the user)verify
- 11actRemove the old keys (only if remove_old = true and the test passed)destructiveverify
SEC.02
What it verifies
Each step ships its own check. The run only moves on when the check passes, so what the recipe reports as done is what is actually on the server.
- 01verifyBack up the keysVerified by
ls -1 "$(getent passwd ${user} | cut -d: -f6)"/.ssh/authorized_keys.bak.* - 02verifyAdd the new keyVerified by
grep -cxF '${pubkey}' "$(getent passwd ${user} | cut -d: -f6)/.ssh/authorized_keys" - 03verifyFix owner and permissionsVerified by
H=$(getent passwd ${user} | cut -d: -f6) && stat -c "%a %U" "$H/.ssh" "$H/.ssh/authorized_keys" - 04verifyTest the new key (login by the user)Verified by
journalctl --since '-15 min' --no-pager | grep 'Accepted publickey for ${user}' - 05verifyRemove the old keys (only if remove_old = true and the test passed)Verified by
ssh-keygen -lf "$(getent passwd ${user} | cut -d: -f6)/.ssh/authorized_keys"
SEC.03
Guardrails
Non-negotiable instructions the run must respect, whatever it finds on the server.
Use the real home (getent passwd), never a hard-coded /home/<user> (root = /root). Never overwrite authorized_keys before the NEW key has been tested successfully; without a successful test, keep the old ones. Never lock out the last access. Show fingerprints only, not keys.
SEC.04
Variables
What you choose before launching — the recipe fills in the rest.
| Name | Meaning |
|---|---|
| ${user} | User |
| ${pubkey} | New public key |
| ${remove_old} | Remove the old keys (after testing the new one) |
SEC.05
How a recipe runs in Servor
Servor is zero-knowledge: the platform cannot execute anything on its own. When you launch this recipe, a run reads the reconnaissance, plans the steps and asks for your approval. Each approved command is signed by your browser — with a key the server never sees — then relayed verbatim to the agent, which verifies the signature locally before executing.
search by intent — type “firewall”, get ufw
- 01Read-only reconnaissance before any change
- 02Every command signed by your browser, approved by you
- 03Each step verified before the run moves on, every run kept in the history
SEC.06
Deploy on Servor button
Maintain SSH key rotation or a project that needs it? Put this button in your README or on your site: one click and your users install it on their own server.
SEC.07
More security recipes
- 01Harden SSHTurns off password login and root password login, keeps keys. Destructive: verify your key access first.
- 02fail2banfail2ban with the SSH jail on the right port, active and verified.
- 03UFW firewallUFW: denies incoming by default, allows the real SSH port + chosen ports, with a safety net. Destructive: keeps SSH open.
- 04Automatic security updatesEnables automatic security updates: unattended-upgrades (Debian/Ubuntu) or dnf-automatic (RHEL/Fedora).
- 05CrowdSecCrowdSec collaborative IPS, SSH collections and firewall bouncer.
Verified recipe
Run this recipe on your server
Connect a server, launch the recipe, and approve each step as Servor executes and verifies it. Free plan, no card required.