SEC.01

The playbook

The run starts read-only: the recon probes decide what happens next. The steps that follow are adapted to the distribution and state found — a real machine is rarely clean.

  1. 01recondoes the user exist? home folder and shell
  2. 02reconkey location (AuthorizedKeysFile may be non-standard)
  3. 03reconfingerprints of the current keys
  4. 04reconis the new key valid? its SHA256 fingerprint
  5. 05reconis the new key already present?
  6. 06reconSELinux (restorecon needed on ~/.ssh)
  7. 07actBack up the keysverify
  8. 08actAdd the new keyverify
  9. 09actFix owner and permissionsverify
  10. 10actTest the new key (login by the user)verify
  11. 11actRemove the old keys (only if remove_old = true and the test passed)destructiveverify

SEC.02

What it verifies

Each step ships its own check. The run only moves on when the check passes, so what the recipe reports as done is what is actually on the server.

  1. 01Back up the keysVerified byls -1 "$(getent passwd ${user} | cut -d: -f6)"/.ssh/authorized_keys.bak.*
  2. 02Add the new keyVerified bygrep -cxF '${pubkey}' "$(getent passwd ${user} | cut -d: -f6)/.ssh/authorized_keys"
  3. 03Fix owner and permissionsVerified byH=$(getent passwd ${user} | cut -d: -f6) && stat -c "%a %U" "$H/.ssh" "$H/.ssh/authorized_keys"
  4. 04Test the new key (login by the user)Verified byjournalctl --since '-15 min' --no-pager | grep 'Accepted publickey for ${user}'
  5. 05Remove the old keys (only if remove_old = true and the test passed)Verified byssh-keygen -lf "$(getent passwd ${user} | cut -d: -f6)/.ssh/authorized_keys"

SEC.03

Guardrails

Non-negotiable instructions the run must respect, whatever it finds on the server.

Use the real home (getent passwd), never a hard-coded /home/<user> (root = /root). Never overwrite authorized_keys before the NEW key has been tested successfully; without a successful test, keep the old ones. Never lock out the last access. Show fingerprints only, not keys.

SEC.04

Variables

What you choose before launching — the recipe fills in the rest.

NameMeaning
${user}User
${pubkey}New public key
${remove_old}Remove the old keys (after testing the new one)

SEC.05

How a recipe runs in Servor

Servor is zero-knowledge: the platform cannot execute anything on its own. When you launch this recipe, a run reads the reconnaissance, plans the steps and asks for your approval. Each approved command is signed by your browser — with a key the server never sees — then relayed verbatim to the agent, which verifies the signature locally before executing.

recipe — fail2ban_setup150+ in catalogue
security4 steps · low risk · idempotentrun
reconsshd present? ufw active? existing jails?✓
actinstall fail2ban · write default jails✓
actenable service · restart sshd (safe)✓
verifytest ban 60s · jails active · sshd alive✓

search by intent — type “firewall”, get ufw

  • 01Read-only reconnaissance before any change
  • 02Every command signed by your browser, approved by you
  • 03Each step verified before the run moves on, every run kept in the history

SEC.06

Deploy on Servor button

Maintain SSH key rotation or a project that needs it? Put this button in your README or on your site: one click and your users install it on their own server.

Deploy on ServorDark background
Deploy on ServorLight background
[![Deploy on Servor](https://servor.app/badges/deploy-on-servor.svg)](https://servor.app/deploy/rotate-ssh-keys)

SEC.07

Verified recipe

Run this recipe on your server

Connect a server, launch the recipe, and approve each step as Servor executes and verifies it. Free plan, no card required.